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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 










JOHN D. WOSOTOWSKY, 
 
                            Appellant 
___________                         
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 2-11-cr-00203-001) 
District Judge: Honorable Maurice B. Cohill, Jr. 
___________                         
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)  
October 25, 2012 
 
Before:    HARDIMAN, GREENAWAY, JR., and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: June 4, 2013) 
 





VANASKIE, Circuit Judge. 
John D. Wosotowsky appeals a judgment of the District Court sentencing him to 
ninety-seven months’ imprisonment.  Specifically, Wosotowsky challenges the District 
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Court’s application of a four-level sentencing enhancement for “a violation of securities 
law” pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(18)(A).  Finding no error, we will affirm the 
District Court’s sentence and judgment. 
I. 
 Wosotowsky worked as a broker and a financial planner for more than twenty-six 
years.  He held professional licenses authorizing him “to sell any and all securities, 
annuities (fixed & variable), and insurance.”  (Appendix (“A.”) 74-75.)  He was also a 
compulsive gambler and an alcoholic.  To satisfy the demands of his addictions, 
Wosotowsky employed an elaborate investment scheme to defraud his clients out of more 
than two million dollars.   
 The scheme spanned nearly ten years, from September 2000 until May 2010.  
During that time, Wosotowsky was associated with the investment company MetLife, 
Inc. (“MetLife”).  Wosotowsky also formed a fictitious company, Equity I & R, and then 
misrepresented to his victims that Equity I & R was a “clearing house or a transfer 
company” that provided secure financial investment products with high rates of return 
“under the umbrella of MetLife.”  (A. 16-17.)  Wosotowsky’s victims – many of whom 
were elderly, financially unsophisticated, and vulnerable – paid money to Equity I & R, 
believing it was a safe investment; instead, payments to Equity I & R went into a bank 
account under that name, which was controlled entirely by Wosotowsky.  
 In addition, Wosotowsky changed the addresses of his victims’ MetLife files to 
mailing addresses which he maintained.  He then forged some victims’ names to make 
withdrawals and loan requests from legitimate accounts, and he had those payments sent 
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to the mailing addresses he controlled.  He also forged those victims’ signatures and 
deposited the funds into the Equity I & R bank account.  To maintain the appearance of 
legitimacy, Wosotowsky prepared and mailed fraudulent quarterly and monthly financial 
statements detailing the investments, including the balances of principal and interest, and 
the rates of return.   
 In 2010, one of Wosotowsky’s victims attempted to withdraw money from a 
product he believed he had purchased, only to learn that he had no such account.  This 
discovery sparked the investigation that ultimately led to Wosotowsky’s arrest.   
 On October 11, 2011, Wosotowsky entered a plea of guilty to one count of mail 
fraud and one count of making a false declaration to the Internal Revenue Service.  The 
United States Probation Office prepared a presentence report that recommended a four-
level enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(18)(A), for offense conduct by a 
broker involving a violation of securities law.  Wosotowsky filed an objection to the 
enhancement, the government filed a response, and on February 14, 2012, the District 
Court held a sentencing hearing which included oral argument from both parties 
addressing the enhancement’s applicability to Wosotowsky’s conduct. 
After hearing argument, the District Court concluded the enhancement applied, 
and calculated Wosotowsky’s sentence accordingly.  Based on an adjusted offense level 
of 30 and criminal history category I, the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines (the “Guidelines”) 
range was 97 to 121 months’ imprisonment.  Without the enhancement, the Guidelines 
range would have been 63 to 78 months.  The District Court sentenced Wosotowsky to 97 
months’ imprisonment.  Wosotowsky now appeals, contending the District Court failed 
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to state a proper basis for the enhancement because it did not identify either a specific 
“violation of securities law,” as that term is defined in the Guidelines, or the conduct that 
supported the enhancement.  Further, Wosotowsky argues that application of the 
enhancement is factually unsupported in the record. 
II. 
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231, and we have appellate 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a).  We review “factual 
findings relevant to the Guidelines for clear error and . . . exercise plenary review over a 
district court’s interpretation of the Guidelines.”  United States v. Grier, 475 F.3d 556, 
570 (3d Cir. 2007) (en banc).   
A. 
 We turn first to Wosotowsky’s argument that the District Court committed 
procedural error because it failed to properly explain the basis for the enhancement.  At 
sentencing, a district court must meet certain procedural requirements, including the 
requirement that the court “adequately explain the chosen sentence.”  Gall v. United 
States, 552 U.S. 38, 50 (2007).  As our case law has made clear, this requirement must be 
flexible to accommodate the “fact-bound nature of each sentencing decision,” and, thus, 
“there is no ‘uniform threshold’ for determining whether a court has supplied a sufficient 
explanation for its sentence.”  United States v. Merced, 603 F.3d 203, 215 (3d Cir. 2010) 
(citing United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 567 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc)); see also 
United States v. Ausburn, 502 F.3d 313, 328 (3d Cir. 2007) (“[W]hile the record must be 
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adequate for review, it need not be perfect.”).  We simply require that there be a 
sufficient record to allow meaningful appellate review.  Ausburn, 502 F.3d at 328.  
 Here, the District Court found that Wosotowsky’s conduct warranted a four-level 
sentencing enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(18)(A)(ii), which is applicable 
if an offense involved “a violation of securities law and, at the time of the offense, the 
defendant was . . . a registered broker or dealer . . . .”  Id.  After hearing oral argument on 
the issue of the enhancement, the District Court stated: “As far as I’m concerned, what 
we have here is a broker and he was dealing with securities, and the manner in which he 
did it was a violation of securities law.  So I make a finding that the enhancement does 
apply in this case.”  (A. 214.) 
 Focusing on this statement alone, Wosotowsky urges us to remand this case 
because the District Court failed to state the specific securities law Wosotowsky violated 
or the conduct that supports that violation.  Wosotowsky’s repeated assertion that no 
specific securities violation was ever identified is belied by the record.  In both its written 
submissions and at the sentencing hearing, the Government made a detailed argument 
that the conduct Wosotowsky pled guilty to violated 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5.  A review of 
the sentencing hearing transcript reveals that the District Court was persuaded by the 
Government’s arguments, and, therefore, found that the enhancement was justified in this 
case.  We are satisfied that the sentencing hearing and the parties’ briefs provide a 
sufficient record for our review and an ample basis for the District Court’s conclusion 
that Wosotowsky was a broker who violated securities law.  Therefore, we will not 
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overturn the District Court’s sentence for failing to provide an adequate record for our 
review. 
B. 
 We will now address the question of whether application of the enhancement is 
factually supported in the record.  Wosotowsky does not dispute the District Court’s 
finding that he is a broker.  Thus, the only question is whether Wosotowsky’s scheme 
violated securities law as defined by the Guidelines.  Application note 14 to § 2B1.1 
defines “securities law” as follows:  
Securities law (i) means 18 U.S.C. §§ 1348, 1350, and the 
provisions of law referred to in section 3(a)(47) of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(47)); 
and (ii) includes the rules, regulations, and orders issued by 
the Securities and Exchange Commission pursuant to the 
provisions of law referred to in such section. 
 
U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 cmt. n.14 (internal quotation marks omitted).  One of the provisions of 
law referenced in 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(47) is the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 
U.S.C. § 78a).  Thus, “securities law” as defined by the Guidelines includes all of the 
provisions and regulations issued pursuant to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 
 The Government argues Wosotowsky’s conduct violated 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5, a 
regulation enacted pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 78j and commonly referred to as Rule 10b-5.    
This regulation “makes it unlawful for any person, in connection with the purchase or 
sale of [a] security, to (1) employ a device, scheme or artifice to defraud; (2) make any 
false statement of material fact; or, (3) engage in any act, practice or course of business 
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that operates as fraud or deceit upon any person.”1
It is undisputed that Wosotowsky employed a scheme to defraud, that in doing so 
he made material false statements, and, further, that he engaged in acts and practices 
which defrauded and deceived his victims.  Thus, his conduct violated Rule 10b-5 so long 
as his scheme involved “the purchase or sale of any security.”  17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5.  In 
support of the contention that Wosotowsky’s sham products were securities, the 
Government points to Congress’ definition of a “security,” which includes any 
“investment contract.”  15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10).  The Supreme Court has defined 
“investment contract” as follows: 
  United States v. Haddy, 134 F.3d 542, 
548 (3d Cir. 1998).   
[A]n investment contract for purposes of the Securities Act 
means a contract, transaction or scheme whereby a person 
                                              
1 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 provides: 
 
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by 
the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate 
commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national 
securities exchange,  
 
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, 
 
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit 
to state a material fact necessary in order to make the 
statements made, in the light of the circumstances under 
which they were made, not misleading, or 
 
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business 
which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any 
person, 
 




invests his money in a common enterprise and is led to expect 
profits solely from the efforts of the promoter or a third party, 
it being immaterial whether the shares in the enterprise are 
evidenced by formal certificates or by nominal interests in the 
physical assets employed in the enterprise. 
 
SEC v. Howey, 328 U.S. 293, 298-99 (1946).  We agree with the Government and the 
District Court that Wosotowsky’s scheme fits within this definition of investment 
contract and, thus, violates Rule 10b-5. 
 Wosotowsky concedes that his fraudulent products fit within this broad definition 
of securities.  He contends, however, that the products he purported to sell are excluded 
from federal securities law by 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(8), which exempts from federal 
securities law “[a]ny insurance or endowment policy or annuity contract or optional 
annuity contract, issued by a corporation subject to the supervision of the insurance 
commissioner, bank commissioner, or any agency or officer performing like functions, of 
any State or Territory of the United States or the District of Columbia.” 
 Wosotowsky’s argument is unavailing for two reasons.  First, the products 
Wosotowsky purported to sell were variable – not fixed – annuities, which fall within the 
scope of Rule 10b-5 notwithstanding the exemption set forth in § 77c(a)(8).  See SEC v. 
Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co. of Am., 359 U.S. 65, 69-73 (1959).  Second, the exemption 
is inapplicable here because it only excludes annuities issued by a qualifying 
corporation.2
                                              
2 Wosotowsky contends this argument is waived because the Government did not 
argue it before the District Court.  We are not limited to the bases relied upon by the 
District Court, however, and we may affirm a ruling of the District Court “for any proper 
  On this second point, we are unconvinced by Wosotowsky’s assertion that 
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the record is unclear as to who – Wosotowsky, Equity I & R, or MetLife – actually issued 
the annuities.  Instead, we find the record entirely clear on this point: no party issued any 
legitimate annuities.  Wosotowsky purported to sell a variety of annuities, but this was a 
sham.  Thus, no qualifying corporation ever issued annuities that could bring the products 
within § 77c(a)(8)’s exemption. 
 Moreover, in addition to annuities, the record contains evidence that Wosotowsky 
also contracted to sell traditional securities in the form of money market and mutual 
funds.  (A. 129-30.)  Finally, the Government’s uncontested proffer at the sentencing 
hearing established that Wosotowsky convinced some of his victims to sell legitimate 
securities in exchange for his false products.  This conduct also falls within the scope of 
Rule 10b-5, which applies to fraud in connection with “the purchase or sale of any 
security.”  17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (emphasis added).  Accordingly, we conclude that 
Wosotowsky’s scheme violated securities law as defined by the Sentencing Guidelines 
and, consequently, that the District Court did not err by applying the four-level 
enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(18)(A).   
III. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s sentence and 
judgment. 
                                                                                                                                                  
reason that appears on the record even where not relied on by it.”  United States v. Perez, 
280 F.3d 318, 337 (3d Cir. 2002).   
